In his 1949 paper, "The completeness of the first-order calculus", Henkin developed what is now called the method of (individual) A model like the one Henkin constructed for his set S^, is commonly known as a Henkin model. It is the kind of model in which each member of the domain "has a name". Henkin accomplished this by making each member of his domain a name of itself, a radical move at the time. In consequence, though, the restriction of his model to L does not constitute a Henkin model of S, a pity in the event that S does have such a model.
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In his 1949 paper, "The completeness of the first-order calculus", Henkin developed what is now called the method of (individual) terms 1 to establish that every consistent set of statements of a first-order language L has a model of cardinality α, a the number of statements of L. The idea is to start with such a set S, construct a so-called term-extension L + of L by adding a new terms to the vocabulary of L, 2 extend 5 to a maximally consistent and term-complete set Soo of statements of L + , 3 and construct a model of S& whose domain consists of the terms of L + . When restricted to L, the model in question automatically constitutes one of S. Henkin's result has come to be known as the Strong Completeness Theorem for First-Order L. Another, and more familiar, version of the theorem has it that if a statement A ofL is true in every model of a set S of statements ofL, then A is provable from S. Henkin himself did not bother to prove this. He merely proved the special case of it, known as the Weak Completeness Theorem for First-Order L 9 where S is 0.
A model like the one Henkin constructed for his set S^, is commonly known as a Henkin model. It is the kind of model in which each member of the domain "has a name". Henkin accomplished this by making each member of his domain a name of itself, a radical move at the time. In consequence, though, the restriction of his model to L does not constitute a Henkin model of S, a pity in the event that S does have such a model.
To commemorate the publication of Henkin's paper, we offer here two new completeness proofs for first-order Z,. 4 The language considered by Henkin had an unspecified number of terms to start with, but those played no special role in his proof. The one we construct in Section 2 has denumerably many, and these will play a crucial role in our proofs. In the first of them, begun in Section 3 and concluded in Section 5, no new terms will be added; in the second, presented in Section 5 and relating to truth-value semantics, 5 denumerably many will be. The proofs are sharpenings of proofs of Leblanc's in [10] . They have two cases each, Case One minding the consistent sets of statements of L that extend without the use of new terms to a maximally consistent and term-complete one, and Case Two minding the rest. Importantly, given our purpose, the former sets prove to be the sets of statements of L that have a Henkin model. And, importantly in its own right and for our two proofs, which hinge on this, the former sets also prove to be the sets of statements of L that are (what we call) instantially consistent, i.e. the sets of statements of L from which no contradiction is (what we call) instantially provable.
The notion of instantial provability is a straightforward generalization of the notion of provability in omega-logic; and its distinctive rule, according to which a universal quantification of L is provable from the set of its infinitely many instances in L, is a straightforward generalization of the omega-rule of omegalogic. 6 Henkin had already identified the consistent sets of statements of L that have a Henkin model in a 1954 paper, "A generalization of the concept of omega-consistency", but that identification, we feel, is less natural than the one offered here.
We touch in Section 6 on the history of these various notions, and then turn to more special, but rather intriguing, matters. As we will have shown in Section 4, any term-complete set of statements of L that is consistent in the standard sense is also instantially consistent. So there might be a temptation to conclude that consistency in the standard sense plus term-completeness amounts to instantial consistency. Not so: the set of all the substitution instances in L of a quantification (VX)A of L, though instantially consistent, is generally not term-complete. There might also be a temptation to think that term-consistency and instantial consistency are the same. Not so again, though counterexamples are harder to come by. Henkin had constructed in his 1954 paper a term-consistent set of statements of L that in effect is not instantially consistent: it featured two monadic predicates and the identity sign '='. And we constructed another in Weaver [14] , which featured two monadic predicates but not '='. We construct two more here, one featuring one dyadic predicate but not '=', the other featuring one monadic predicate and '=\ The last of these counterexamples cannot be improved upon: as we go on to show, any term-consistent set of statements of L that features a single monadic predicate but not '=' is instantially consistent, and hence has a Henkin model.
2
The first-order language L whose strong completeness we prove has as its primitive signs countably (i.e., finitely or denumerably) many predicates, these denumerably many (individual) variables:
•* > y* Z) x 9 y > z, j these denumerably many terms:
ti,t 2 ,..., listed here in alphabetical order, the three logical operators '-', 'D', and 'V, the two parentheses '(' and ')'> and the comma V. And its denumerably many statements, presumed to be arranged in some alphabetical order, are of the following four forms: (i) P(T U T 2 ,..., T n ), where P is an n-adic (n = 1,2,...) predicate of L and T Ϊ9 T 2 ,..., T n are n not necessarily distinct terms of L;
, where A and B are statements of L; and (iv) (VX) A, where Xis a variable of L and the result >1(T/X) of replacing ^ everywhere in A by a term Γ of L is a statement of L. 7 We presume the four logical operators '&', V, 'Ξ=', and '3\ used only in Section 6, to be defined in the customary manner. And, for brevity's sake, we omit outer parentheses whenever clarity allows.
Usually, one would acknowledge as the axioms ofL the statements of L of such forms as these six:
plus the statements of L of the form (VX)(A(X/T)), where A is an axiom of L and Γis a term of L. Given a statement A of L and a set S of statements of L, one would next acknowledge as a. proof of A from S in the standard sense any finite sequence of statements of L whose last entry is A, and every one of whose entries is: (i) a member of S, (ii) an axiom of L, or (iii) the consequent C of a conditional B D C of L and both B and BD C occur earlier in the sequence. And one would then say that A is provable from S in the standard sense, for short,
S\-A,
if there exists a proof of A from S in the standard sense.
A proof of A from S in the instantial sense, on the other hand, would be any countable sequence of statements of L whose last entry is A, and every one of whose entries is as in (i)-(iii) above or is (iv) a quantification (VX)B of L and all the substitution instances B(tι/X) 9 B(t 2 /X),... of (VΛ^B in L occur earlier in the sequence. And one would say that A is instantially provable from S, for short,
ShΛ,
if there exists a proof of A from S in the instantial sense.
In each account, (iii) is of course modus ponens, the Elimination Rule for 'D' of natural deduction. In the second, (iv) is the rule of infinite instantial induction. As it is a (nonstandard) Introduction Rule for 'v\ we call it Vli. 8 As the reader well knows, a statement of L is provable in the standard sense from an infinite set of statements of L if, and only if, provable in that sense from a finite subset of it (Point One). However, a statement of L may be provable in the instantial sense from an infinite set of statements of L and yet not be provable in that sense from any finite subset of it (Point Two). (VX) A, for example, is provable in the instantial sense from the set of its substitution instances in L, but it is not generally provable in that sense from any finite subset of that set.
Used here for convenience and novelty are accounts of provability equivalent to, but quite different from, the foregoing. They dispense, in particular, with axioms and proofs. The account of provability in the standard sense is in two parts. The first one attends to provability from a finite set of statements of L. Its eight clauses are counterparts of rules of natural deduction, and they bear the names of those rules. The other part, attending to provability from an infinite set of statements of L, is Point One. Because of it the sets S and 5' in the first part may of course be infinite as well as finite. Expectedly, given Point Two, the account of instantial provability attends at a stroke to provability from a finite set of statements of L and provability from an infinite one.
Provability in the standard sense

Part One
Suppose S a finite set of statements of L. 
Part Two
Rule distinctive of provability in the instantial sense, with S allowed again to be infinite:
Lemma 1 holds by definition. Its converse fails, of course: though instantially provable from the set {P(Γ): for any term TofL],' (Vx)P(x)' is not provable in the standard sense from any finite subset of the set nor-as a result-from the set itself.
Lemma 1
IfSVA, then SV { A.
A number of syntactical notions, some of them already mentioned in the previous pages, require definition. Suppose S a set of statements of L. We shall say that S is 
and one of the sets shown in Section 4 to be term-consistent but not instantially consistent is this binary counterpart of it:
{P(T,T')ι for any term T and any term T' of L\ U {-(Vx)(Vy)P(x,y)}.
The notion of term-consistency is used only in Section 6. 14 Proof of the fact is in [10] , but as it is lengthy we do not reproduce it here.
Lemma 2 (a) If S is instantially consistent, then S is consistent in the standard sense; (b) If S is inconsistent in the standard sense, then so is at least one finite subset ofS; (c) If Sis consistent in the standard sense, then so is either S U [A} or S U {-A} for any statement A of L; (d) If Sis instantially consistent, then so is either S U [A} or S U {-A} for any statement A ofL; (e) IfSU{ -A} f -A, then S U {-A} is inconsistent in the standard sense; (f) IfS U {-A} h A, then SU [~A] is instantially inconsistent; (g) If Sis consistent in the standard sense and-for any statement A ofL-either A belongs to S or -A does, then A is maximally consistent; (h)
When *=' is added (as in Section 6) to the vocabulary of L, these changes are in order: 
. ,$ D (T n )) belongs to 3 D (P), and in the case that A is an atomic statement of the form T= T', β D (T) = β D (T').
The changes that in the presence of '=' must be brought to the completeness proofs in Sections 3-5 are like those Henkin brings to his own proof. We shall not rehearse them here.
3
Sharpening the first result obtained by Henkin in his 1949 paper, we establish that any instantially consistent set of statements of L extends to a Henkin set (=Theorem 1). Proof of this calls for Lemma 3, where the term Tconstitutes, if you will, a witness of ~ (yX)A. In Henkin that term would be new to L; here, by contrast, it is one of the terms of L. Two other versions of Lemma 3 will eventually turn up.
Lemma 3 If S U [~(VX)A] is instantially consistent, then so is S U {~ (VX)A,~A(T/X)} for at least one term T of L.
Proof: Suppose S U {~(VX)A,~A(T/X)} instantially inconsistent for every term Tof L. Then, by -I and ~E, S U {~ iyX)A) V { A(T/X) for every such Γ, hence by Vli S U {~(VX)A} h (VX)A, and hence by Lemma 2(f) S U {~ (VX)A) is instantially inconsistent.
This attended to, let S (also called S o for convenience's sake) be a set of statements of L that is instantially consistent; for each n from 1 on, let S n be defined as follows, with A n there the alphabetically nth statement of L and in Case 3 Γthe alphabetically earliest term of L such that, owing to Lemma 3, S π _i U {A ni~B (T/X)} is instantially consistent:
is instantially consistent and A n is not a o __ I negated quantification (Case 2)
n -]
S rt _i U [A n ,~B(T/X)) ifS n -X U [A n ] is instantially consistent and A n is a negated quantification -(VX)B (Case 3);
and let S^ be defined as follows:
«=o By the construction of S n , Lemma 2(d), and Lemma 3, S n (n = 1,2...) is instantially consistent if S Λ _i is. But, by supposition, S o is instantially consistent. So, by mathematical induction on n,S n (n = 0,1,...) is instantially consistent, and hence by Lemma 2(a) is consistent in the standard sense. But, if so, then St oo is consistent in that sense. For suppose S^ were inconsistent in the standard sense. Then by Lemma 2(b) so would be some finite subset of So,, 16 and hence by Thinning so would be S n for some n or other. But, by the construction of S n and that of 5^, either A belongs to S& or ~A does, this for any statement A of L. So by Lemma 2(g) S^ is maximally consistent. Suppose next that, for some quantification (V^)^ of L,S VB(T/X) for every term ToΐL, but S*, 1/ (VX)B. Then by Lemma 2(h) -(VX)B belongs to SΌo. But, if so, then by the construction of So, there exists an n such that -(VX)B belongs to S n9 and hence by the construction of S n there exists a term of Tof L such that ~B(T/X) belongs to S n and hence to S^. So by Reiteration S^ h ~B(T/X) for at least one term Γof L, and hence Soo is inconsistent in the standard sense, contrary to the result just obtained. So S^ is term-complete. So:
Theorem 1 IfSis instantially consistent, then S extends to (a set of statements of L that constitutes) a Henkin set.
The parenthesis is of course for emphasis. The Henkin set to which Henkin's own S in [5] extended was made up of statements of a certain term extension L + of L. As announced in Section 1, the one to which our S extends is made up exclusively of statements of L.
Suppose now that a set S constitutes a Henkin set, and -adapting Henkin's construction of a model to suit our own needs -let D be { < t 1 
Theorem 2 If S is instantially consistent, then S has a Henkin model.
Case Two of the proof is to the effect that if 5 is consistent in the standard sense but not instantially consistent, then S again has a model, but not a Henkin one. We postpone consideration of it until Section 5, however, and devote the balance of this section and the next to various results about Henkin sets, Henkin models, etc.
Suppose first that S h A, and look back at our account of instantial provability. A transfinite induction on the nine rules there will establish that S U {-A] cannot have a Henkin model. So:
Lemma 5
IfS has a Henkin model, then S is instantially consistent.
So by Lemma 4(b):
Theorem 3
If S extends to a Henkin set, then S is instantially consistent. 4 Theorem 1 also holds for S consistent in the standard sense and term-complete rather than instantially consistent. The resulting theorem, the converse of which we already know to fail, has two important consequences regarding instantial consistency and instantial provability.
Lemma 6
Let X be foreign to A. Then: 
Proof: (a) Let Γbe an arbitrary term of L foreign to {(VX)(A D B),A] and to (VX)B. Then {(VX)(A D B),A] h (VX)(A D B) by
Proof: (a) By Lemma 2(c) and Lemma 7. (b) Suppose S U [~(VX)A] is term-complete. Then by Lemma 7 so is S U [ -(VX)A,~A (T/X)} for every term T of L. Suppose further that S U {-(VX)A,~A(T/X)} is inconsistent in the standard sense for every term Γof L. Then, by -I and ~E, S U {-(VΛ^) h
A(T/X) for every such T, hence S U {~(VX)A} h (VX)A by the term-completeness of 5 U {~ (VX)A}, and hence 5 U {-(VX)A} is inconsistent in the standard sense by Lemma 2(e).
Given Lemma 8, proof that S extends to a Henkin set when consistent in the standard sense and term-complete mimicks the proof of Theorem 1. You define S n (n = 0,1,...) and S^ as before; presuming that S Λ _i(n = 1,2,...) is consistent in the standards sense and term-complete, you next show-using Lemma 8 in lieu of Lemma 2(d) and Lemma 3-that S n also is; and given that S n (n = 0,1,...) is consistent in the standard sense, you then show in the same way as before that S^ constitutes a Henkin set. So:
Theorem 5
IfSis consistent in the standard sense and term-complete, then S extends to a Henkin set.
The result is a generalization of another version of the Strong Completeness Theorem for Omega-Logic.
Hence these two results regarding instantial consistency and instantial provability: Corollary 1 permits this alternative proof of Theorem 3. Suppose S were instantially inconsistent and yet did extend to a Henkin set Soo. By Thinning Sŵ ould be instantially inconsistent, hence by clause (a) of the corollary Soo would be inconsistent in the standard sense, and hence by Lemma 4(a) S^ would not constitute a Henkin set.
Corollary 1 Let S be term-complete. Then: (a) S is consistent in the standard sense if, and only if, S is instantially consistent', (b) S \-A if, and only if, S h
5
We exploit results in Leblanc [8] and [10] to conclude our First Completeness Proof for First-Order L. Throughout, we take a set S of statements of L to be infinitely extendible if, and only if, denumerably many terms of L are foreign toS.
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Lemma 9 //SU{-(VX)A} is consistent in the standard sense, then so is SU{~(VX)A,~A(T/X)} for any term Tof L foreign toSU{~(VX)A}.
Proof: Like that of Lemma 3, but using VI in place of Vlj.
Now suppose that in the preamble to the construction of the set S n in Section 3, Tis taken to be the alphabetically earliest term of L foreign to S n -λ U {A n } . 20 Together with Lemma 2(c), Lemma 9 then delivers this second variant of Theorem 1:
Theorem 6
IfSis consistent in the standard sense and infinitely extendible, then S extends to a Henkin set. 21 And, together with Lemma 4(b), Theorem 6 delivers this variant of Theorem 2:
Theorem 7
If Sis consistent in the standard sense and infinitely extendible, then S has a Henkin model. 22 The 
It is easily verified that
Lemma 10 (a) If S is consistent in the standard sense, then so is the double rewrite of S; (b) If the double rewrite ofS is true on β D , then S is true on the double rewrite ofβ D .
This done, suppose S consistent in the standard sense but not instantially consistent. S cannot be infinitely extendible, for if it were, then by Theorem 6 it would have a Henkin model, which by Theorem 4(a) it cannot have. However, the double rewrite of S is infinitely extendible, and by Lemma 10(a) is consistent in the standard sense. So by Theorem 7 that double rewrite has a Henkin model, the one on p. 
Theorem 9 IfSis nonempty and instantially consistent, then S is true on at least one truth-value assignment to the atomic substatements of S in L.
But, clearly, no set of statements of L that is instantially inconsistent can be true on a truth-value assignment to its atomic substatements in L. So this counterpart of Theorem 4:
Theorem 10
Let S be nonempty.
Then: (a) S is true on at least one truth-value assignment to the atomic substatements of S in L if and only if S is instantially consistent; (b) S is true on at least one truth-value assignment to the atomic substatements of S in L if and only if S is a subset of a Henkin set.
Owing to Theorem 10(a), the truth-value of a nonempty set S of statements of L -a function of the truth-values of the atomic substatements of S in L-is F always when S is instantially inconsistent; otherwise it is either T or F. 26 Case Two of our second proof is just a bit more work. Let L + be the result of adding denumerably many new terms to the vocabulary of L, and extend to L + every definition in Section 2, that in this section of an infinitely extendible set of statements of L, and that in this section again of the substatements in L of a statement of L and of a set of statements of L. Clearly, all sets of statements of L are infinitely extendible qua sets of statements of L + . So, owing to Theorem 6:
Theorem 11
If a nonempty set S of statements ofL is consistent in the standard sense, then S extends to a Henkin set of statements ofL + .
So Case Two of our second Completeness Proof for First-Order L:
Theorem 12
If a nonempty set S of statements ofL is consistent in the standard but not the instantial sense, then there exists a truth-value assignment to the atomic substatements of S in L + -though not to those in L only-on which S is true.
In view of Theorem 12, the truth-value of a nonempty set S of statements of L is a function of the truth-values of the atomic substatements of S in L + , that truth-value F when the set is inconsistent in the standard sense, otherwise either TorF.
One brand of truth-value semantics, that of Dunn and Belnap in [2] , understands by a term-extension L + ofL any first-order language that is exactly like L except for having countably many new terms; and it takes a set S of statements of L to be truth-value verifiable by fiat when S is empty, otherwise if S is true, for some term-extension L + of L, on at least one truth-value assignment to the atomic substatements of S in that L + . 21 
The preceding results guarantee that S is truth-value verifiable if, and only if, S is consistent in
6
The rule Vli is our extension to terms in general of a rule in certain systems of arithmetic according to which a quantification (VX)A is provable from the denumerably many results of replacing X everywhere in A by a numeral. The rule, proposed by Tarski in a lecture of 1927 and published seven years later in Tarski [13] , was called by him-we noted in Section I -the rule of infinite induction. Also known for a while as Carnap's rule, it is now commonly called the omega-rule of omega-logic. 291 The strong completeness of omega-logic follows from Theorem 3 above; and Theorem 3, conversely, can be had from the Omitting Types Theorem in [1] by a straightforward generalization of the OmegaCompleteness Theorem there (Theorem 2.2.9 and Proposition 2.2.13, respectively). And it follows from results in Section 3 and results of Henkin's in [6] (Theorem 7, p. 194) that the notion of instantial consistency is equivalent to Henkin's notion of strong T-consistency for the case where Γ consists of all the terms of L. "Strongly Γ-consistent" is of course the other way we mentioned in Section 1 of identifying the sets of statements of L that have a Henkin model.
The notion of term-consistency is an extension to terms in general of the notion of omega-consistency introduced by Gόdel in [4] ; and the notion of term-completeness is a similar extension of the notion of omega-completeness introduced by Tarski in [13] . As for the notion of instantial consistency, it is our extension to terms in general of the notion of consistency in omega-logic. Sets of statements of L that are instantially consistent are term-consistent, of course, the way sets of statements of omega-logic that are consistent in omega-logic are omega-consistent. But, as reported in Section 1, sets of statements of L that are term-consistent are not always instantially consistent, and hence sets of statements of omega-logic that are omega-consistent are not always consistent in omega-logic. Henkin's own set in Henkin [6] is a case in point, as are these three sets which we mentioned in Section 1 : 
U (P(Γ) D (Γ ΦUD P(T')):forany term Tand any term T ofL}. 29
That S 2 is instantially inconsistent is immediate, given Reiteration and Vli. Proof that the other two sets are instantially inconsistent calls for this lemma, proof of which is familiar:
Lemma 11
Let X be foreign to B
. Then S h (3X)A DBifShi VΛQ (A D B).
Since obvious steps deliver
Si h i (Vx) (P 1 Lastly, similar steps and the definition of '&' will deliver both S 3 h(3.)')(.y*t 1 &~P(j>)) and S 3 h~(3>')O'*t 1 &~PO>)).
Our proof that each of Si, S 2 , and 5 3 is term-consistent uses the following lemma, which provides a sufficient (though not necessary) condition for a set of statements of L to be term-consistent.
Lemma 12
If ) when Γ' is the same as Γ*, otherwise T' Φ t x is false on £)J*. 31 So there exists a denumerable set Σ of terms of L 9 namely the set of all the terms of L other than % 9 , such that, no matter the member T* of Σ, every T*-variant of β D constitutes a model of S 3 . So by Lemma 12 S 3 is term-consistent. So all three of Si, S 2 , and S 3 are instantially inconsistent but nonetheless term-consistent.
Though sufficient for a set of statements to be term-consistent, the condition in Lemma 12 -we parenthetically remarked -is not necessary. Proof of our closing result uses this lemma, proof of which we leave to the reader:
Lemma 13 (a) Let X be foreign to B. If S h (3X)A and S h (IX) ~ A, then S
This attended to, consider a first-order language L ι that has a single predicate, say, T\ that predicate a monadic one; and, given a domain £> and a £>-interpretation Sjj of L 1 , let R be this binary relation on D: is term-inconsistent because instantially inconsistent.
In summary, then, for a set S of first-order statements to have a Henkin model, it is (i) sufficient and necessary that 5 be instantially consistent (Theorem 2), (ii) sufficient, but not necessary, that S be consistent in the standard sense and either term-complete (Theorem 5) or infinitely extendible (Theorem 6), and (iii) necessary, but not sufficient, that S be term-consistent (Lemma 2(i)), unless of course S features a single predicate and that predicate is a monadic one (Corollary 2). 33 
